and radio.6 Eventually, television brought into people's homes most of the dramatic moments occasioned by the coup: the tanks rolling into Moscow, the building of barricades and Yeltsin mounting a tank on 19 August; mass pro-democracy rallies in Moscow and Leningrad on 20 August; the tank incident that led to the death of three civilians defending the White House in the early hours of 21 August; the return of Gorbachev to Moscow twenty-four hours later; the celebration of Freedom Day on 22 August; and the funeral on 24 August. Television provided people with a great deal of information during the coup and by no means all of it proved favorable to the plotters. Predictably, the plotters attempted to use television as a mouthpiece for the Emergency Committee and to suppress information that contradicted the image of a smooth transition to emergency rule. They operated on assumptions that dated from the era before glasnost', when television had been a dependable, cowed propaganda instrument of the regime, promoting its glories and editing out the slurred speech and mispronunciations of its leaders. 7 Here, as in other respects, members of the Emergency Committee and their supporters underestimated the changes that had taken place in Soviet mass media since 1985. The previous six years had brought far-reaching changes to television, gradually transforming it into a genuine forum for a broad range of ideas.8 When Kravchenko was appointed the head of Gosteleradio in fall 1990, he took steps to eliminate some of the more outspoken programs, such as the popular "Vzgliad" (viewpoint) which featured controversial reporting and dis- cussions of current affairs.9 Such repressive measures soon provoked a response from those more sympathetic to the aims of glasnost'. The USSRJournalists' Union expelled Kravchenko on 12 April 1991, citing his efforts to reintroduce censorship on television. A number of well known commentators resigned from Central Television in "a dramatic protest" against Kravchenko's policies."0 That the spirit of glasnost' had made deep inroads into Gosteleradio despite Kravchenko's conservative leadership soon became evident on 19 August. Faced with an order to return to the pre-1985 style and content of journalism, some reporters, cameramen, editors and supervisors at Gosteleradio did their best to circumvent the new rules. The situation at Leningrad television-for some years a maverick station in the production of controversial programs-was even more remarkable." Boris Petrov, the president of Leningrad television, cooperated fully with the democratic opposition, led by Mayor Anatolii Sobchak. With a viewing audience of about forty-five million people extending to Moscow, the Baltic republics and Belarus', the Leningrad station exerted considerable influence. On the first day of the coup, Petrov secured a satellite connection to facilitate broadcasting beyond the station's normal range. 12 From the inception of the crisis, Central and Leningrad television transmitted reports, images and commentary that conveyed not just one version of the events-the official version promoted by the Emergency Committee-but several other views of what was happening and why. There were, in fact, three major "scripts" that dominated media coverage of the coup. By "script" or "scenario" we do not mean a prepared text that a director or an actor uses in a theatrical performance."3 Rather, we are suggesting that the leading individuals and 11. In the era of glasnost', the Leningrad studio produced some of the most probing and provocative programs on television anywhere in the USSR, including "600 Seconds," "The Fifth Wheel" and "Alternative" (Sergei Aleksandrovich Muratov, "Soviet Television and the Structure of Broadcasting Authority," in Siefert, ed., Mass Culture and Perestroika: 174).
12. See the interview with Anatolii Sobchak, "Breakthrough: The Coup in St. Petersburg" in Bonnell, Cooper and Freidin, eds., Russia at the Barricades, part 3; Fiegelson, 85.
13. "Script," according to The American Heritage Dictionary, is, among other things, "a text of a play, broadcast, or motion picture; especially the copy of a text used by the director or performer." groups during the coup had intellectual agendas and political outlooks already well formed before the curtain rose on the putsch (hence, our "script"), and that these, in turn, shaped their responses to the events as they unfolded during the crucial three days and subsequently.14 Furthermore, "script" implies for us a set of symbols, images and styles which, in accordance with a given situation, signal actors to act or improvise and signal "audiences" to interpret what they see in particular ways. The theatrical metaphor is, of course, an essential ingredient in politics in general and in mass politics in particular, a theme well researched and well documented in cultural and political scholarship."5 What makes "script" (stsenarii) even more apposite is that it was used by various public figures, along with such related theatrical notions as "plot" (siuzhet), "action" or "performance" (igra), "characters" (personazhi) and "to perform or act according to a script" (razygryvat'). According to the conspirators, the crisis in the Soviet system-a situation they characterized as imminent chaos and anarchy-could only be resolved by revitalizing the country's links with the past, which for them meant the Soviet Union before perestroika. This desire to reconnect was encoded in the very designation of their committee, the GKChP, translating into the lumbering Gosudarstvennyi komitet po chrezvychainomu polozheniiu (State Committee on the State of Emergency). These initials implied an association with the venerable ChK (Cheka), the progenitor of the KGB, with KP, the Russian initials for the Communist Party, and, of course, with ChP (an emergency situation), an overused colloquialism over the seventy-five years of incessant "emergency situations" in the economy, society and politics. The continuity thus implied was that of the Communist Party, the military-industrial complex, the secret police and, more generally, a unified state untroubled by the nationalist aspirations of its member republics.
The most important counterpoint to the Emergency Committee's scripting of events between 19 and 21 August came from the democratic resistance, led by Yeltsin. Yeltsin's response to the formation of the GKChP was swift. By 9 a.m., he had issued an "Appeal to the A third script-the perestroika script-remained on the sidelines during the first two days of the crisis, only to emerge with Gorbachev's release from incarceration on 21 August. Unwilling to change his perspective even after the coup, Gorbachev persisted in reading from that script, which portrayed the country's democratic future as flowing out of her cruel and tyrannical communist past. Socialism and the Communist Party as the sole surviving pan-Union political institution could not be omitted from his script. But, if before the putsch a drama revolving around the socialist idea and the Party was attracting fewer and fewer good actors, not to mention an increasingly sparse audience, it became a solo performance in a nearly empty theater after the coup had failed.
In an era of instant replay, major political players and commentators tend to swap rhetoric as much as they swap their primary functions: commentators are a real force in the political game, which in the era of nationalism and democracy revolves around symbols, whereas politicians use their authority and visibility to shape the public discourse in a way that automatically implies a framework of legitimacy for their policies. Having gone through the school of bolshevism, with its treasury of experience in manipulating public discourse, having graduated from the academy of Gorbachev's glasnost', which introduced into public consciousness the necessity of logical reasoning, open-minded analysis, humanistic values and, almost, public honesty, the players and commentators of the August days were offered an unprecedented opportunity to deploy their rhetorical and aesthetic skills. It was as if their life depended on it, and in fact it did. Committee's press conference was broadcast live, in its entirety, on Central Television.
For their first-and as it turned out, only-press conference, the plotters adopted the format introduced by Gorbachev in 1985, which permitted spontaneous questioning by foreign and Soviet reporters. Considering the care with which the plotters attempted to seize control of the mass media-even to the point of forbidding employees of Gosteleradio to leave with film except by permission of the chief editorit is certainly puzzling that they submitted to a press conference of that kind, with all its attendant risks. One can only surmise that they felt compelled to do so in an effort to establish their credibility with foreign powers and, perhaps, the Soviet population as well. 27 The press conference cast in sharp relief the style of the conspiracy, leaving little to the imagination with regard to its master script and the ineptitude of its members. The press conference was, for the most part, Yanaev's show.
In camera work, there are always choices and the camera lens can be a merciless eye, if so directed. During the press conference the choice was to focus on Yanaev in such a way that his hands were continuously visible-hands that trembled intermittently, conveying 27. It is quite possible that the members of the Emergency Committee taking part in the press conference were not aware that the press conference was being broadcast live. The cameras were not turned off right after the press conference drew to a close but lingered for a minute or two, long enough for the viewers to be privy to the following exchange between an enterprising reporter and Yanaev. The reporter: "Gennadii Ivanovich [Yanaev], can you give us assurances that this press conference will be broadcast in its entirety?" Yanaev: "Well, I don't think I am the man to answer this question. You shouldn't really address it to me. .." The reporter: "Can you give us assuarances that this press conference will be broadcast to the public in its entirety?" great agitation in contrast to his authoritative booming voice. Remarkably, the camera returned again and again to that particular framing of Yanaev, though it would have been easy enough to direct the camera's eye elsewhere-perhaps to a close-up of Yanaev's face or a long shot in which the tell-tale tremors would have been invisible to the television audience. In the control room a decision had been made to capture the image in a particular way. Veteran "Vremia" director, Elena Pozdniak, who had made a career splicing out Brezhnev's bloopers from videotape, decided she would do what she could to preserve, at the very least, a marginal sense of honesty. She had gotten word from Kravchenko and his deputies that, if it was technically possible, she should edit out Yanaev's trembling hands, the laughter in the hall and the scoffing reactions of the correspondents for the rebroadcast of the press conference following the nine o'clock "Vremia." Although this was easy enough to do, Pozdniak decided: "Let them see it all!" She'd had enough of the lies.31 Thus even the officially engineered coverage of the press conference turned out to be a visual humiliation for the plotters.
In the charged atmosphere of an unfolding conspiracy, the desire to understand and to interpret every detail pertaining to it is overwhelming. Yanaev's trembling hands and runny nose (like Nixon's legendary five-o'clock shadow) became for many people a symbol of the plotters' criminality, ineptitude and inexperience. They evoked the common Russian saying, "trembling hands give away the chicken thief" (ruki drozhat-kur voroval) and the usage of saplivyiz literally meaning The press conference had a profoundly discouraging effect on potential supporters, such as KGB Major General Aleksandr Korsak and his fellow officers. When Korsak first heard the announcement of the state of emergency at 6 a.m., he responded favorably: "The words were the right ones and the people on the committee carried some weight." The support of KGB officers was indispensable if the coup was to succeed, but the press conference helped to turn them against the conspirators. According to Korsak, "after the press conference by the GKChP, the general impression was created that this was a simple adventure and the perplexing questions multiplied."33 Many army and police officers shared Korsak's reservations and refused to cooperate with the Emergency Committee.34
In Leningrad, not long after the live broadcast of the press conference, the Leningrad TV news program "Fakt" went on the air. The appearance and demeanor of the anchor on "Fakt" immediately suggested a deviation from the straight-laced, Soviet-style announcer favored by the conspirators, a style that dominated Central Television 32. The question about Yanaev's health was asked by the correspondent from La Stampa. It was a double-entendre question, referring not only to the alleged sickness of Gorbachev, but also to the answer Yanaev gave when he was asked about his health at the Supreme Soviet at the time he was being considered for the post of vice-president. "My health is all right," he responded, "My wife ain't complaining." The question Long shots of people building barricades are followed by an interview with a few men who had come to defend the White House, including a worker, an engineer, a student and an intellectual. Yes, they are planning to stay there all night if need be. "Do you have enough bread to last you?" "Yes, we do," answer some. "We don't need any bread," answers a younger man (a worker, judging by his appearance) with grim determination, "We'll do it without any bread at all." "What made you think that this was the place you should come to?" Medvedev asks them. "It's Vilnius, Vilnius taught us our lesson," answers the intense-looking intellectual with a carefully trimmed beard. One of them, a man in his fifties, most likely a worker, points to his heart and says that it was his heart that told him to be here. He works at the ZIL factory, one of Moscow's biggest industrial employers, where they gave him time off when he informed his bosses about his plans. "We are here because we have something to defendour legitimate elected representatives, our power," the intellectual cuts in.
Medvedev Wednesday's "Vremia" was produced in a power vacuum. The program aired that evening was a hybrid, combining elements from the Russian democratic narrative and some of the style and ambiance of the Soviet script. The announcers were the same dour figures who presided during the previous two days but the content of the program was radically different. In a voice that showed little emotion or deviation from the Soviet standard, the announcer began with the dramatic statement that the putsch had been overthrown by the democratic forces. Members of the Emergency Committee were labeled "adventurists" by the same announcers who only twenty-four hours earlier had reported on behalf of the Emergency Committee. Although the plotters had been repudiated, the scripting of Wednesday's "Vremia" did not disengage entirely from the rhetoric and format of the junta days. The key word was still stabil'nost' and the format of the program duplicated that of the previous two evenings; only the political content had changed. After a summary of the major developments, the program showed segments from different parts of the country. As on previous evenings, pictures of urban serenity dominated the newscasts; only now, in such cities as Alma-Ata, Barnaul and Kuzbass, the proverbial man or woman in the street was implacably opposed to the junta. Only on Thursday did a dramatic change take place in "Vremia." The day had been proclaimed a national holiday, Freedom Day, by the Russian Parliament. Most members of the Emergency Committee had been arrested; one (Pugo) had committed suicide. Yeltsin was at the peak of his popularity. When "Vremia" came on the air, the anchors had been changed: now Sergei Medvedev, the reporter who had put together Monday's pro-democratic segment, presided over the news program. Not only was this a great vindication for Medvedev, but his appearance marked an important shift in the style as well as the content of reporting. Far more casual and direct than his predecessors, he functioned as an anchorman and commentator rather than a mere mouthpiece. Young, energetic and articulate, he spoke in a natural and unformulaic way, without the standard Soviet rhetoric.
The heart of Thursday's "Vremia" was film footage, apparently unedited, of an incident early Wednesday morning that had left three men dead. This clip, shot in semi-darkness and accompanied by somber music, had a moving, almost piercing effect: a Moscow street, the barricade of trolley busses, unarmed people trying to prevent the APCs from passing through the barricades, shots, bodies falling and crushed by tank treads, Molotov cocktails going off, more shots, blood on the pavement; and later that day, an improvised shrine and grief-stricken Muscovites in mourning over the "martyrs" who "perished as a result of an unsuccessful attempt to storm the White House." The report helped to create a national surge of feeling for the three young men who lost their lives "defending our freedom."54 The "Vremia" broad- 58. The Russian Orthodox funeral service was for Dmitrii Komar' and Vladimir Usov and conducted in the Vagan'kovo Cemetery by the Patriarch; theJewish service was for Ll'ia Krichevskii. Jewish funerals are not held on Saturdays. An exception was made in this case to coordinate with the two Russian Orthodox funerals, which according to tradition were scheduled for the third day after the deaths. Because the Jewish funeral was held on the Sabbath, the rabbi and cantor (from one of Moscow's two synagogues, both Orthodox) could not offer a regular service in a synagogue. religious, of defining the nation around a martyr's ultimate sacrifice. 59 The phrase "they gave their lives for our freedom" was repeated again and again throughout the broadcast of the funeral. Naturally, the leitmotif of this new social bond found its fullest expression in the television coverage of the two funeral services conducted concurrently for the victims: one in a Russian Orthodox church, the other, a Jewish service, held out of doors.
The television coverage moved back and forth between theJewish and Russian Orthodox services, from the rabbi and cantor to the priests and Patriarch and back again, with an even-handedness that bespoke deliberate staging for the television audience. In light of the many decades of Soviet anti-religious and anti-Semitic policies, the lengthy coverage of both services provided a fascinating spectacle for millions of viewers. But equally remarkable and politically eloquent was the balanced treatment given to the two religions. That all three should be mourned together was critically important for the victorious democratic resistance. The coverage was scripted to emphasize not only the ecumenical, but also the multi-ethnic, multi-class citizenship in the new Russia (Dmitrii Komar', an Afghan veteran and a worker, was, judging by his name, Ukrainian; Il'ia Krichevskii, was a Moscow artist of Jewish origin; Vladimir Usov was Russian and an entrepreneur60). This important ecumenical message was captured in the civic ritual of the heroes' interment. Each coffin was covered with a Russian tricolor flag and then lowered into the grave to the accompaniment of the Russian national anthem. The TV cameras were positioned high above the graves, figuratively transporting the viewers high into the sky. The image of the flag-draped coffin, with the Russian anthem playing in the background, signaled the fact that this was, above all, a funeral for national heroes, "martyrs," whose deaths were inextricably linked to the forging of a new nation.
The week ended as it had begun: millions of television screens beaming the gripping, real political drama into people's living rooms, bringing the affairs of state and nation-building into a close and intimate relationship with every viewer. The funeral served as the culmination of the television coverage of the perevorot-coverage that created the first true media event in the history pf the Soviet Union. The crisis in high politics had been profoundly and decisively shaped by the electronic eye which transformed, instantly and continuously, elements of a political confrontation into meaningful scripts with their corresponding images, styles and symbols. The 1991 televorot that began at 6 a.m. on 19 August with the televised announcement of the formation of the Emergency Committee received a fitting closure on Saturday afternoon, 24 August, with live coverage of a funeral that was as much a memorial to the three men as the consecration of a nation.
